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CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND
CONSTITUTIONALLY OPTIONAL
BENEFITS AND BURDENS
Larry Alexander*
INTRODUCTION
A bedrock assumption of almost all judicial and academic
interpreters of the Constitution is that the Constitution is in large
part permissive. That is, most laws or governmental actions are
neither forbidden nor required by the Constitution but are
merely permitted.l I will call this presumably rather large set of
governmental actions "constitutionally optional."
The purpose of this essay is to show that this assumptionthat there are (many) constitutionally optional laws and governmental actions-gives rise to some immense and perhaps intractable difficulties in justifying large areas of constitutional
doctrine. At stake is the entire domain of the Equal Protection
Clause (and the equal protection component of Fifth Amendment due process), as well as the "equal protection" component
of other constitutional rights, which is sometimes dealt with as a
matter of equal protection, and sometimes as a matter of unconstitutional conditions on the rights in question.2 At the most general level, the theoretical difficulties I elaborate are all bound up
*

Professor of Law, University of San Diego.

1. An approach contrary to this assumption is that outlined by Richard Epstein,

who argues that a correct interpretation of the Constitution produces a blueprint of a
single constitutionally valid set of laws. According to Epstein's Constitution, the common
law prevails (with the distribution of wealth it produces), subject to some modification
through the exercise of the police power and the eminent domain power. Epstein's constitutional scheme leaves no theoretical room for government choice, hence, leaving no
room for politics in the normal sense. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property
and the Power of Eminent Domain (Harv. U. Press, 1985); Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions and Bargaining Breakdown, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 189, 202-07 (1989);
Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of
Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 14-28 (1988); Larry Alexander, Understanding Constitutional Rights in a World of Optional Baselines, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 175, 178-80 (1989).
2. Compare Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)
and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (content-based speech restrictions invalidated
under the equal protection clause) with, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland,
481 U.S. 221 (1987) and Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (content-based discriminations among media invalidated on first amendment grounds). See also Church of the
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in the question of why the greater power to choose the option or
to forgo it does not include the lesser powers to place conditions
on it or to distribute it unequally. How is it that one can have a
constitutional complaint over conditions attached to or inequalities in the distribution of a benefit that one has no constitutional
right to in the first place? Unless that question can be given an
answer, much of constitutional law will lack a solid theoretical
foundation.
I. THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS: OF
LAWS, ACTIONS, AND OMISSIONS, BENEFITS AND
BURDENS, INDIVIDUAL LAWS AND SETS OF LAWS,
AND SWITCHES OVER TIMES
The notion of constitutional optionality applies to any type
of governmental action that can be subject to constraint by constitutional norms. Thus, a law or an administrative rule can be
constitutionally optional, but so too can an administrative or judicial decision in an individual case not covered by a pre-existing
rule. Thus, a decision by a governmental official about whom to
hire for a particular job might be a matter of optionality within a
range of possibilities. So, too, might a decision by a judge about
how severely to sentence offenders.
An important corollary to the constitutional optionality of
laws and governmental actions is that their omission-the failure
to enact those laws or undertake those actions-is likewise constitutionally optional. If, for example, public welfare or public
education is a constitutionally optional benefit, then not only is
provision. of such benefits constitutionally permissible, but so too
is the repeal of those benefits or the failure to provide those benefits initially.
That omissions are constitutionally optional if their corresponding actions are optional might seem trivial because it is analytically true. Nonetheless, it becomes important if optionality
forces a consideration of governmental motives: motives behind
failures to act are frequently much more opaque than motives
behind actions.
Frequently, the notion of constitutional optionality is associated with benefits, particularly the benefits of the modern welfare state. Thus, the Supreme Court has stated or implied that
welfare payments, public schools, public libraries, and public
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (regulation discriminating against religious practice invalidated under Free Exercise Oause).
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health care are constitutionally optional.3 The domain of constitutional optionality, however, is much broader than those public
welfare benefits. It includes any other benefits that government
is constitutionally at liberty to provide or not to provide. And it
includes as well all burdens with respect to which the government
has a similar liberty.
Thus, if the government has the constitutional liberty to impose five years of imprisonment for robbery or ten years, then
ten years of imprisonment is a constitutionally optional burden
on those serving such a sentence. Likewise, if government has
the constitutional liberty to regulate taxi service in particular
ways or to leave it unregulated, the regulation of taxi service in
those ways is a constitutionally optional burden on those
regulated.
In one sense, the point here is merely semantic. What I have
called constitutionally optional burdens-for example, ten years
imprisonment or regulation of taxi service-can be turned
around so that constitutionally optional "benefits" are at stake:
five years of imprisonment or freedom from regulation. And
constitutionally optional benefits, such as welfare, can be viewed
as burdens if one adopts the standpoint of the taxpayer. The important point, however, is not a semantic one. It is that the domain of constitutionally optional governmental action is quite
broad. Indeed, it apparently includes almost all possible governmental actions.
Although it is common to speak of specific laws or governmental actions as constitutionally optional or nonoptional, constitutionality-and, derivatively, constitutional optionality and
nonoptionality-is actually an attribute of entire sets of laws.
Thus, public education might be regarded as a constitutionally
optional benefit in the context of most sets of laws, but not if the
remaining laws include a law conditioning the right to vote upon
literacy or education. Likewise, a literacy or education requirement for voting may be a constitutionally optional burden but
only if there is universal public education. And freedom of
speech might demand either the set of laws a, b, and c or the set
of laws x, y, and z but forbid the set of laws a, b, and z. If so, it
will be true but misleading to speak of the optionality of any particular law a-z. Only if a particular law is optional-or nonoptional (forbidden or required)-in all possible sets of laws will it
3. See generally San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 33-35
(1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,546-47 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 484 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
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be accurate to speak of that particular law as optional (or nonoptional). Generally, when we speak of individual laws or actions
as optional or nonoptional, we are referring to the entire set of
laws to which that particular law belongs.
Finally, true constitutional optionality requires that the government always be permitted to reconsider the current status of a
benefit or burden. If government possessed the option whether
to have, say, welfare or public education only at the onset of its
existence as a government, but was required as a constitutional
matter to stick forever with whatever choice it made at that time,
nothing would now be constitutionally optional. Constitutional
optionality now means constitutional optionality tomorrow and
the day after. Although the Takings Clause, the Contracts
Clause, the Due Process Clauses, and the Ex Post Facto Laws
Clauses place some constitutional limits on government's ability
to change otherwise optional laws-to protect against unfair upsets of expectations-government in general may constantly
change its mind regarding optional benefits and burdens. As we
shall see, this point about optionality has important implications
for constitutional theory.
II. THE DOCTRINAL DOMAINS OF
CONSTITUTIONALLY OPTIONAL BENEFITS
AND BURDENS
As noted earlier, optionality questions are implicated most
strongly in issues arising under the Equal Protection Clause and
the equal protection components of other clauses-most notably,
the Speech and Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. A true equal protection case always assumes that what is
at stake is a constitutionally optional benefit or burden. The
complainant is objecting, not to receiving, say, a certain level of
welfare, education, or some other benefit or burden, but to receiving less of that benefit (or more of that burden) than a comparison group is receiving. If there is an equal protection
problem with the way the optional benefit or burden is allocated
among groups or individuals, it can be remedied either by government's allocating more of the benefit (or less of the burden)
to the complainant or by government's allocating less of the benefit (or more of the burden) to the comparison group. Thus, if
the government is denying equal protection by giving whites
more welfare than blacks, or by giving embezzlers less punishment than larcenists, it can remedy the violation either by giving
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blacks and embezzlers more or by giving whites and larcenists
less.4
Similarly, although freedom of speech is typically thought of
as a noncomparative right-a denial of freedom of speech is objectionable even if government is denying it to everyone-there
is a comparative (or equal protection or optional benefit and burden) side to freedom of speech. For in many cases freedom of
speech is nothing more than a ban on government's discriminating on the basis of subject matter discussed or viewpoint
expressed.s
Thus, in the area of time, place, and manner regulations,
government has great latitude in deciding whether or not to permit expressive behavior. For example, it may deny demonstrators the right to demonstrate in a prison yard, to conduct a sleepin in a public park, or to burn their draft cards.6 On the other
hand, it would also be constitutional for government to allow
demonstrations in prison yards, sleep-ins in public parks, or draft
card destruction. Thus, all of these activities represent constitutionally optional benefits that government may withhold or grant
at its option. What government may not do, however, is grant
these optional benefits only to demonstrators expressing certain
ideas or viewpoints, unless the government has a sufficient justification for its discrimination in granting the optional benefits. In
other words, there is an "equal protection" doctrine that applies
to subject matter or viewpoint discrimination in regulating the
time, place, and manner of speech. 1
Similarly, when government is spending its own resources to
speak, the courts have imposed an equal protection limitation,
albeit quite erratically. Government funding of speech-its own
or another's-is a paradigmatic optional benefit. Government
need not give money to family planning clinics, to the endowments for the arts or humanities, or to public broadcasting, nor
need government run municipal theaters or even public schools.
When it chooses the option of funding these enterprises, how4. This is why cases like Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that restriction of access to contraceptives to married persons violates Equal Protection Clause),
are not true equal protection cases: the benefit, access to birth control, can only be ratcheted up because it is constitutionally mandated by the Due Process Clause. See Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. See note 2 supra.
6. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (public
park sleep-in); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (prison yard demonstration).
7. See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Carey v. Brown,
447 u.s. 455 (1980).
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ever, it faces some constitutional restrictions on its ability to
favor certain ideas or subjects.s
Much of Establishment and Free Exercise Clause doctrine
likewise invokes a nondiscrimination principle in the granting of
optional benefits and burdens. The Free Exercise Clause has recently been narrowed by the Supreme Court to the point that it
appears to cover very little other than discrimination. Thus, government may now be able to ban all uses of alcohol or drugs and
all slaughtering of animals-none of which, of course, it is constitutionally compelled to do-no matter how serious the effects of
such bans on religious practices might be. What it may not do, at
least without a compelling reason, is limit its bans to religious
uses of alcohol and drugs or to religious slaughter of animals.9
While the Free Exercise Clause deals with religious discrimination in the imposition of optional burdens, the establishment
clause limits religious discrimination in the granting of optional
benefits. Because every possible allocation of optional benefits
and burdens will affect the relative prospects of various religions
(and nonreligion) differently, the major difficulty under both the
Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses is to determine the
constitutional baseline from which to measure discriminatory
effects.
As with the Speech and Religion Clauses, the Due Process
Clauses have an equal protection component, though the courts
have been much more willing to allow government discrimination in this area. Thus, while government constitutionally may
finance the live births of indigent women without financing their
abortions-that is, may condition the optional benefit of publicly-financed medical procedures on how the constitutional right
to choose between live birth and abortion is exercised-the
Supreme Court has hinted that government may not condition
the optional benefit of ordinary welfare or even publicly financed
general medical care on forgoing the right to an abortion.to

8. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,201-03 (1991); Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
9. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993);
Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990).

10.

See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474-75 n.8 (1977).
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APPLYING THE CONSTITUTION TO OPTIONAL
BENEFITS AND BURDENS: THE THEORYDEPENDENCE OF JUSTIFICATIONS AND THE
IMPERIALISM OF THEORY
A

If there are constitutional constraints on the allocation of
optional benefits and burdens, what explains them? How can it
be that the Constitution prohibits giving more of good G to X
than to Y -unless there is a sufficient justification for doing sobut does not prohibit giving even less G to Y as long as X gets
the same amount of G as Y?
The texts of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
and the First Amendment's Speech and Religion Clauses surely
do not contain clear rules dictating the results the courts have
reached. And although some who make the Framers' original
intentions authoritative find clear rules embedded in these intentions, those rules tend to be much narrower constraints on optional benefits and burdens than is found in current judicial
doctrine. Thus, some read the intent behind the Equal Protection Clause to be a rule requiring that there be no racial discrimination in specific domains of benefits and burdens, a much
narrower conception of equal protection than is currently
enforced. It
In today's jurisprudence, perhaps with the exception of facial religious discrimination, there are no per se rules in any of
these domains, and surely none that can be said to be textual or a
direct reading of the Framers' intentions. Instead, we have varying standards of judicial review, all of which refer to how government must justify its allocations of optional benefits and burdens.
The judicial doctrines in play refer to "compelling," "important,"
"substantial," and "legitimate" governmental interests. They
also refer to degrees of "fit" between the governmental means in
question and the ends those means are supposed to further. And
they debate the level of generality at which the ends are to be
characterized for purposes of determining means/ends fit, and
how to deal with the fact that government usually pursues multiple ends in a single act, or at least a primary end constrained by
multiple secondary ones.
11. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 123-24
(U. of Okla. Press, 1989); Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of
the Fourteenth Amendment 191-92 (Harv. U. Press, 1977).
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How do we know what governmental interests are legitimate, or how important they are, at what level of generality they
should be characterized, and how the government's acts must
"fit" with these various interests? The answer is that we cannot
know these things without some normative theory about the
proper ends of government. If we are Benthamite or Millian utilitarians, for example, then we will be able to assess allocations of
optional benefits by whether they maximize social utility. Indeed, maximizing social utility is the only legitimate governmental end. It is therefore always compelling. And it is at the level
of generality expressed by "maximizing social utility" that government's plurality of more specific ends must be characterized
in order to determine whether its means "fit." Moreover, only
100% "fit" at that level of generality is acceptable. For a utilitarian, no over or under-inclusiveness in the relation of means to
ends is ever permissible where the end in question is "maximize
social utility."
A utilitarian normative theory would thus answer the questions about justifying governmental allocations of optional benefits and burdens. So too would some contractarian normative
theory such as that of John Rawls, a theory which several constitutional theorists would read into the Constitution.tz Thus, for
those theorists, an allocation of optional benefits or burdens
would properly "fit" with "legitimate" and "compelling" ends described at the correct level of generality if those allocations maximized the positions of the least advantaged. Likewise, those who
would read the Constitution as embodying an essentially libertarian normative theory of government would assess means and
ends through the prism of their chosen brand of libertarianism.B
Thus, the justifications at issue in assessing allocations of optional benefits and burdens unsurprisingly require a justificatory
theory such as utilitarianism, contractarianism, or libertarianism
might provide. And here is the kicker: The justificatory theories
that would provide the framework for assessing the allocations of
optional benefits and burdens will tend themselves to undermine
the optionality of those benefits and burdens. In other words, jus12. See, e.g., David AJ. Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action (Oarendon
Press, 1971); David AJ. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (Oxford U. Press,
1986); David AJ. Richards, Fourulations of American Constitutionalism (Oxford U. Press,
1989); David AJ. Richards, Conscience and the Constitution: History, Theory, and Law of
the Reconstruction Amendments (Princeton U. Press, 1993); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1
(1969).
13. See, e.g., Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain
(cited in note 1).
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tifying allocations of optional benefits and burdens requires a
comprehensive theory, but a comprehensive theory is a normative blueprint that leaves no options but rather either mandates
or forbids every possible set of laws and governmental actions.
When I say that any comprehensive theory that would justify
(or invalidate) allocations of optional benefits will be a blueprint
for government action that undermines optionality, I do not
mean that any normative theory must render a moral verdict of
forbidden or required on all possible actions. Although accounting for a domain of moral freedom is a theoretically difficult enterprise, especially for consequentialist moral theories, I assume
that such a domain is theoretically justifiable when we are dealing with individual moral agents.
A domain of moral freedom is much more problematic,
however, if we are dealing with the government. Although there
may be some areas where the moral options of the governed
(say, to prefer opera over dance) appear to translate directly into
options for the government (to prefer a municipal opera over a
municipal ballet), even then it is more accurate to say that government has no other option than to reflect the preferences of
the governed. And when we move to optional benefits like welfare or public education, it is difficult to imagine that any comprehensible normative theory would regard them as within the
realm of individual moral freedom, much less a matter of governmental moral freedom.
Therefore, applying constitutional constraints to allocations
of optional benefits is theoretically problematic. We cannot decide whether the government's interests in support of its allocations are legitimate or sufficiently weighty without a
comprehensive normative theory. A comprehensive normative
theory, however, will undermine the optionality of the benefits in
question and demand a single pattern of allocation.
B

Perhaps the most attractive solution to the predicament
posed in the preceding section is to assume that more than one
comprehensive normative theory can justify governmental acts.
Thus, to simplify matters, let us assume that government acts in a
constitutionally justified manner if its entire set of laws are consistent with either the set of laws a thoroughgoing contractarian
like Rawls would enact or the set of laws a libertarian like Nozick
or Epstein would enact. In other words, the Constitution is con-
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sistent with either Left liberalism or Right liberalism but with
nothing else.14
On such an assumption we can explain both nonoptional
constitutional rights and optional benefits and burdens. The former represent the area of overlap between Left and Right liberal
theories, what both Rawls and Nozick would forbid or require.
The latter represent the area in which the theories dictate different results. Thus, while both theories would support a common
core of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and privacy, Left
liberalism would demand and Right liberalism would forbid
many of the redistributive programs of the welfare state, such as
welfare and public education. Those welfare state programs, required by one theory and forbidden by the other, would be constitutionally optional.
Optional normative theories may explain the existence of
· constitutionally optional benefits and burdens. However, we
have not yet fully explained constitutional constraints on the allocations of those optional benefits and burdens. Thus far, we
have only explained one option, the option to choose that set of
laws demanded by Left liberal theory or that set of laws demanded by Right liberal theory. We have not explained the
existence of options that represent neither the pure Left liberal
nor the pure Right liberal position.
Put differently, we have shown how there can be a constitutionally legitimate thoroughgoing welfare state and a constitutionally legitimate thoroughgoing libertarian state. We have not
shown how there can be a constitutionally legitimate modest welfare state. And because orthodox constitutional doctrine assumes many more optional benefits and burdens than the two
stark, polar options of Left and Right liberalism-basically, the
vast number of sets of laws that represent positions in between
those poles-positing optional normative theories is not sufficient fully to explain orthodox constitutional assumptions.
What is necessary to explain the full panoply of options is
this: We must assume that the Constitution permits the government to choose not only between Left liberalism and Right liberalism but also among various positions that lie "between" those
two poles (viewing the poles somewhat spatially). Thus, if Left
liberalism demands $15,000 of welfare per year to the average
poor person, and Right liberalism forbids welfare altogether,
government has the constitutional option to choose any level of
14. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Modern EqUiJI Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 Ohio St. LJ. 3, 24-39 (1981).
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welfare between $15,000 and zero. I shall call these intermediate
positions compromise positions because they represent a compromise between pure Left liberalism and pure Right liberal.
With the assumption in place that compromise positions as
well as pure theories are constitutionally permitted, we can now
account for the existence of constitutional options as well as for
constraints on their allocation. The latter represent the fact that
the Constitution permits only the sets of laws endorsed by Left
or Right liberal theories or that represent compromises between
those theories. It does not permit, say, welfare without qualification. It permits welfare only up to what Left liberalism requires
or down to what Right liberalism requires. Beyond those poles
welfare is no longer optional.
We have not yet gotten to where we need to go, however,
for we have still not fully explained the constraints on allocations
of optional benefits and burdens that orthodox constitutional law
assumes. Consider the following example. Suppose Left liberalism requires $15,000 of welfare and Right liberalism requires
that there be no welfare. And suppose the government enacts a
welfare law granting poor whites $10,000 of welfare and poor
blacks $5,000 of welfare. In the absence of some surprising reason for this racial classification within the welfare law, we assume
the welfare law violates the equal protection clause. But why,
given that both $10,000 and $5,000 of welfare lie "between" the
$15,000 and zero polar amounts of Left and Right liberalism?
We need a theoretical explanation of constitutional constraints
on allocations "between" the optional poles.
Coming up with such an explanation has been a formidable
problem in constitutional theory. If the government has the
"greater" power to give poor blacks no welfare (because it has
the power to eliminate welfare altogether), why does it not have
the "lesser" power to give them some welfare, but less than it
gives to whites? Analogously, if government has the "greater"
power to make provocation immaterial to the crime of murder,
why does it not have the "lesser" power to make it an element of
the crime, but one not subject to the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt?ts Or, moving beyond constitutional
law, why does not the "greater" power of publishing scandalous
information about X include the "lesser" power of selling silence
to X?
15. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Cf. Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977) (upholding shifting the burden of proof to the defendant for affirmative
defenses).
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One answer to the puzzle of constraints on intermediate positions is to argue that the particular position that is prohibited is
not really an intermediate compromise. Thus, one could argue
that although government may subsidize political campaigns at
any level up to a certain amount-say, one million dollars-or
not subsidize them at all, it may not subsidize Republican campaigns at a higher level than Democratic ones because to do so
would make Democrats worse off than had there been no subsidy
at all, which is the pole marking one boundary of optionality.
What appears to be a position "between" the poles of no subsidy
and a one million dollar subsidy is really one in which the Democrats are worse off than they are if both parties are at either pole.
This kind of solution is sometimes offered for solving the
puzzle of blackmail. Thus, it is argued that the victim of blackmail-or at least the class of potential victims-or society at
large is actually better off if blackmail is criminalized and the
blackmailer is left to choose between disclosure and being unpaid for silence.16 And this solution works for some kinds of optional benefits, those the value of which is dependent on what
others are getting. But it is doubtful that it works for all optional
benefits. For example, are murder defendants really worse off if
the prosecution must prove the absence of provocation by a preponderance of the evidence than if provocation is completely immaterial to the crime or its degree? And are poor blacks really
worse off getting $5,000 of welfare when whites get $10,000 than
if no one got any welfare at all?
One might try instead to explain constitutional constraints
on intermediate positions on the basis of this principle: When
government reaches a compromise between the polar justificatory theories, the compromise must reflect only considerations
that are material under those theories and may not reflect considerations that are extraneous to those theories.
Thus, if Left liberals consider only the welfare of the least
advantaged, and Right liberals only the integrity of one's person
and property, and neither group considers race to be material,
then government may not structure its welfare program in a way
that assumes the theoretical materiality of race. That is not to
say that racial distinctions are absolutely forbidden, for they
might serve some further end that is material under one or both
of the constraining theories. What government cannot do in between the Left and Right liberal poles is to act for ends that
neither pole endorses.
16. See Symposium: Blocknulil, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1565 (1993).
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I shall characterize this constraint on allocations of optional
benefits and burdens as the constraint of symmetry. To be constitutionally permissible, an allocation lying "between" the polar
justificatory theories must reflect nothing more than the relative
political force of those theories and represent the point at which
the force exerted by each theory in the political arena is exactly
balanced by the force exerted by the opposite theory. If an allocation reflects considerations extraneous to any justificatory theory, then it will not represent a symmetrical compromise whose
shape reflects only the political balance between the polar opposite theories. Asymmetrical compromises will be unconstitutional, which means that the requirement of symmetry is our
missing constitutional constraint.
Still, while the requirement of symmetry may describe the
constitutional constraints on allocations falling between the theoretical poles, I leave it as an open question whether it adequately
justifies those constraints. If blacks in my example are not worse
off receiving less welfare than whites than they would be were
they receiving no welfare, why should we view their relative
treatment as a constitutional wrong? Some might answer that
the treatment is "unfair." But what one regards as fair is a function of one's normative theory. Therefore, all one can be claiming in describing the treatment as "unfair" is that the treatment is
not what it should be under one or the other of the normative
theories in play. In other words, it is not treatment endorsed by
either Rawls or Nozick. But that is true of all compromise allocations, not just those that treat blacks and whites differently.
The position I am examining, then, can be restated as the
following view: If we permit government to choose among two or
more normative theories, then we have as many conceptions of
fairness as we have permissible theories; but no allocation can be
fair if it reflects values not endorsed by any of the permissible
theories. More welfare for whites than for blacks is unfair to
blacks because it must represent values extraneous to either Left
or Right liberalism.17

17. It remains an open question, however, whether this position is really a solution
to the problem of constitutional constraints on allocations of optional benefits and burdens or whether it is merely a redescription of the problem. I leave it to others to answer
this question.
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CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS, GOVERNMENTAL
MOTIVES, AND EFFECTS

A
Let us assume that positing optional normative theories in
the Constitution, which theories establish polar positions between which a government may act so long as it considers only
the relative political forces exerted by the theories, explains how
there can be constitutionally optional benefits and burdens
whose allocations are nonetheless subject to constitutional constraints. The following sections examine some of the more troublesome implications of such a view. I begin with the question of
motive, then turn to effects, and finally examine remedies and
standing.
If there are going to be constitutional constraints on the allocation of optional benefits and burdens, then government's motivation must be a material element in the constitutional analysis.
Why that is so can be illustrated by the following example, in
which I assume that public swimming pools are constitutionally
optional benefits, permitted but not required by the Constitution.
Consider five states' policies regarding public pools:
STATE ONE has had public swimming pools for many years.
STATE Two has never had public swimming pools.
STATE THREE has alternated between having and not having
public swimming pools, depending upon whether Left or
Right liberals controlled the legislature. The decisions the legislature has taken have reflected only the conflict between
Left and Right liberalism. Nonetheless, though quite coincidentally, the pools have been open when whites have been the
principal beneficiaries of the pools and have been closed when
blacks would have been the principal beneficiaries.
STATE FouR has also alternated between having and not having public swimming pools. As in State Three, the public
pools have been open when whites have been the principal
beneficiaries and closed when blacks would have been the
principal beneficiaries. Unlike State Three's legislature, however, State Four's has been motivated by anti-black attitudes.
STATE FivE has had for many years a law authorizing public
swimming pools "during periods when whites but not blacks
would make up the preponderant share of pool users."

Based on the preceding analysis, we can say that, at least
prima facie, State One and State Two have acted constitutionally.
Moreover, if they have acted constitutionally, then so too has
State Three. As I argued earlier, the Constitution does not con-
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tain any principle that "freezes" the option first chosen by the
government and entrenches it against repeal, assuming no takings, contractual impairment, or retroactivity problems.
State Five has violated the Constitution, however. If race is
not a factor picked out by our constraining Left and Right liberal
normative theories, then State Five's policy is not a symmetrical
compromise between optional poles.
That leaves State Four. On the one hand, State Four's policies have had exactly the same external appearance and exactly
the same effects in the world as State Three's constitutionally
permissible policies. On the other hand, there is no functional
difference between State Four's policies and the unconstitutional
law in State Five. State Five's law is not invalid because of its
effects during any narrow time slice. In any narrow time slice, its
pools will either be open or closed, neither of which represents
an unconstitutional state of affairs. (State laws unconstitutionally
segregating public beaches were unconstitutional during all moments of their existence; but at some of those moments at least,
no one actually wanted to swim or to swim at the forbidden
beach.)ts Nor is State Five's law invalid because its pools will
shift from open to closed or vice versa during certain time slices.
State Five's law is invalid because it picks out race, an immaterial
element under the justificatory theories, as a determining factor
for the status of public pools and mandates that race shall affect
that status for the indefinite future.
There is no material difference between State Five's mandate to consider race, a mandate that has no temporal limitation,
and State Four's less formal consideration of race, which will be
no more but surely no less determinative of what happens for the
indefinite future. If State Five's law is unconstitutional, as we
have assumed, then State Four's racially motivated actions are
unconstitutional. Moreover, those actions are unconstitutional
whether they are administrative actions opening and closing the
pools or whether they are in the form of laws-"public pools,"
"no public pools" -so long as the underlying legislative or administrative motives are the same.19
18. See Lawrence A. Alexander, Introduction: Motivation and Constitutionality, 15
San Diego L. Rev. 925, 928-29 (esp. 929 n.20) (1978).
19. See id. at 928-29; Alexander, 42 Ohio State L.J. at 21-23 (cited in note 14).
The statement in text shows why the Supreme Court's decision in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), holding that racially motivated closing of public pools did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause, is inconsistent with its decisions in cases such as Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down under the Equal Protection Clause an
administrative action denying permission to operate a laundry because the applicant was
Chinese). Palmer is no longer good law. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976);
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What makes State Four's actions functionally equivalent to
State Five's is what also distinguishes its actions from State
Three's. Because the legislature in State Three lacks a racial motive, it cannot be predicted to shift from public pools to no public
pools or vice versa in ways that always relatively disadvantage
Blacks, even though in the past those shifts have done so.
What makes State Four's actions different from the constitutionally permissible ones of State Three and similar to the unconstitutional law in State Five is motive. Without motive as a
material element in the constitutional analysis, we cannot make
the distinctions we must make among the actions of States One
through Five. Yet the necessity of a motive inquiry exacts an extremely high price as a matter of constitutional theory.
Laws are unconstitutional because of their predicted effects
over an indefinite period of time, not because of their effects during any given time slice. After all, State Five's unconstitutional
law did not differ in its past effects from the constitutionally permissible actions of State Three, nor would its effects differ during
narrow time slices from the effects of State One's or State Two's
constitutionally permissible laws. Legislative motivation is what
provides the assumption that all law will persist over an indefinite period of time, so that its predicted effects over an indefinite
period become relevant. Because government's choice of an allocation of optional benefits is not frozen by the Constitution and
can always be changed, there is no basis other than motive for
assuming durability over time. And unless durability over time is
assumed, constitutional analysis breaks down. For if time is
sliced sufficiently narrowly, it will be impossible to say of the allocation of optional benefits and burdens during that narrow time
slice that they violate the Constitution.
But why assume motivations are durable? Government
decisionmakers change over time. And any given government
decisionmaker can change his or her attitudes over time.
Take the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkinszo as an example. In
that case, about three hundred Chinese applicants had been denied licenses to operate laundries by the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors before Yick Wo, too, was denied. This pattern did
not itself make Yick Wo's denial unconstitutional. Had the preVillage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Developm~nt Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977). For the same reason, the Court's 1968 rejection of motive inquiry where th~ First
Amendment and optional regulations intersect was untenable and ultimately repudiated.
Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) with Wayte v. United States, 470
u.s. 598 (1985).
20. 118 u.s. 356 (1886).
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vious three hundred applicants been denied licenses because they
were Chinese, but Yick Wo was denied one because of a valid
health, safety, or welfare concern, Yick Wo would not have had
the constitutional grievance the previous three hundred applicants had. What the past cases provided was circumstantial evidence to support the hypothesis that an anti-Chinese motive
explained a fair number if not all the results, since constitutionally permissible rationales for denials of licenses would be very
unlikely to work against three hundred Chinese applicants in a
row.
What is significant, then, is that the past cases are relevant to
Yick Wo's case but not material. They support his claim that he
was denied a license unconstitutionally. And if we assume that
Yick Wo's receiving a license was constitutionally optionalthere were available constitutionally permissible laws or policies
regulating who gets a laundry license that San Francisco could
have employed and that would have excluded Yick Wo-then
what made Yick Wo's denial unconstitutional was its underlying
motive. Yick Wo did not have a constitutional right to a license.
Rather, he had a constitutional right not to have a license denied
for improper reasons even when proper reasons for a denial were
available.
Now why should we care that Yick Wo was denied a license
for the wrong reasons if good reasons were available? Why do
we demand that government act for proper motives if what it
does is consistent with proper motivation in any given case? The
answer, I have argued, is that government's motivations, and the
patterns of laws and actions to which they give rise, are presumed
to persist for an indefinite period, during which period they will
produce effects that cannot be squared with any justificatory theory or proper compromise.
But why assume such permanence? Suppose at the time of
Yick Wo's trial the San Francisco Board of Supervisors was entirely different from the Board that had denied Yick Wo his license. Suppose it is now controlled by Chinese members, so that
no one will likely be denied a license because he is Chinese during this Board's governance. The assumption of durability of the
motive operative in Yick Wo's case has now been rendered false
by the facts. Why should we deem Yick Wo to have suffered an
unconstitutional denial?
Or, to change the example to make it a State Five example
rather than a State Four example, suppose the first three hundred
cases of laundry license applications by Chinese, including Yick
Wo's, were governed by a law that set forth criteria of eligibility
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for such a license, among which was that one not be Chinese.
Yick Wo's case is now before the court. The law under which he
was denied a license has been repealed, however, and Chinese
are now eligible. The law with its racial classification proved not
to be indefinitely durable. How do we explain a conclusion that
Yick Wo was dealt with unconstitutionally?
The answer cannot be in the pattern of results under the law
during the time it was in force. The reason is simple. That pattern could have been produced constitutionally. For recall State
Three and its opening and closing of public swimming pools. It
produced the same pattern as did the unconstitutional actions of
States Four and Five. All that can distinguish the states is the
underlying motivation, and unless that motivation makes some
difference in the effects of government action on individuals, it is
hard to see why it matters. Because the motivation did not distinguish States Four and Five from State Three in the past, it
must be its potential to do so in the future that makes it important. In the hypothetical under consideration, however, that improper motivation has disappeared. In that hypothetical, the
future of States Four and Five, like their past, will be identical to
that of State Three. Therefore, the materiality of motive is
mysterious.
Let us recap the argument here. We assumed that because
State One and State Two were acting constitutionally, so too was
State Three. To say otherwise would be to deny options at any
point except at the beginning of the state's existence. But State
Three was indistinguishable from States Four and Five on any
basis but motive. And motive seemed material only if it was projected into the indefinite future. Its disappearance in our hypothetical after Yick Wo's case then defeats its materiality. But
orthodox constitutional doctrine assumes that if Yick Wo were
denied a license based on his ancestry, he was treated unconstitutionally, even if no one was ever treated that way again. We need
motive to distinguish State Three from States Four and Five, but
the distinction breaks down if motive is not indefinitely durable.
If motive inquiry is necessary in order to deal with constitutional optionality, then there are a number of important implications and problems that attend such an inquiry. Of course, there
is the sometimes formidable evidentiary problem of discerning
what government's motive is or was. The scope of this evidentiary problem can only be fully appreciated by noting the following implications and conceptual puzzles of motive inquiry.
There are two principal implications of motive inquiry that
should be mentioned because these two implications demon-
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strate the scope of the evidentiary difficulties. First, motive inquiry must extend to every law and governmental act that lie in
the domain of constitutional optionality. To return to our original examples, if motive is material in State Four, the state that
opened and closed its public schools depending upon whether
whites or blacks were primarily benefited, then the motive behind the laws in State One, Two, and Three are also material.
For improper motives are all that distinguish States Four and
Five from States One, Two, and Three at any given moment in
time.
The second implication is this: Not only must every law or
governmental decision allocating optional benefits and burdens
be subjected to motive inquiry, but so also must every repeal of a
law and failure to enact a law. A set of laws may be constitutionally permissible at one moment and constitutionally impermissible at the next without any change on the books if the motive for
not changing that set of laws changes from a constitutionally permissible motive to a constitutionally prohibited one.
There are a number of conceptual problems that attend motive inquiry, some well known, others less so. A well known
problem concerns the "motive" of a multimember body.
Although many optional benefits and burdens are allocated according to policies attributable to individual government decisionmakers, many are allocated according to policies embodied
in laws, regulations, and ordinances enacted by multimember legislative bodies. When we speak of the motives of such bodies, to
what facts in the world are we referring? How do we cumulate
the motives of real persons to arrive at the motive of a collective?
What if no particular motive is sufficient for passage (or for failure to enact, or for repeal) of a law? What if no particular motive is necessary? And what do we do with the motives of chief
executives with veto power,21 or with the motives of those opposing the law (or failure to enact, or repeal)?
A perhaps less well known conceptual problem is that of
mixed motivation. Government officials take actions based upon
all sorts of motives, many of which operate simultaneously.
Some officials' motives are just to please their constituents, who
have their own motives for supporting or opposing various acts.
Some officials have other kinds of personal motives (this will
make me a hero, or a martyr, etc.). And some officials have a
mixture of motives reflecting both licit and illicit social concerns.
21. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 666-67 nn.6-7
(1981).
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Does the presence of any motive other than the motive to bring
about the state of affairs mandated by one of the justificatory
theories render the officials' motives unconstitutional? Or must
those other motives be dominant? Sufficient? Necessary?
An even less well known conceptual problem with motive
inquiry has to do with the hierarchical relationship among motives. When we act we do so for the sake of some ultimate ends,
but we also have intermediate ends that motivate us because they
are believed to be means to our ultimate ends. Suppose, however, as is no doubt frequently the case, our intermediate ends do
not serve our ultimate ends, and we are mistaken in believing
them to do so? Although we view our motivations to be consistent, they are in fact inconsistent. For example, we are motivated
as legislators to achieve the ideals of Left liberalism, and we are
motivated to support more redistribution of wealth because we
believe more redistribution will bring about those ideals. Yet, it
turns out that we are mistaken, and that more redistribution will
in fact take us farther away from our ideals. If the test of constitutionally proper motivation is whether we are motivated to
achieve the ends of one of the optional justificatory theories, are
we properly motivated?
In fact, however, this otherwise potentially perplexing problem, unlike the other conceptual and evidentiary problems associated with motive inquiry, turns out to be rather easily
resolvable. For intermediate motives that are inconsistent with
proper ultimate motives will produce laws and actions whose effects fail to match those the normative theories prescribe. And as
the next section argues, effects as well as motives matter.
B

Thus far I have been both making the case for motive inquiry in allocations of constitutionally optional benefits and burdens and also raising various theoretical difficulties with that
case. Even if motive is material, however, so too must be the
effects of government's laws and actions. Proper motivation-in
our example, the motivation to realize Left or Right liberalism or
a symmetrical compromise between them-is necessary for constitutionality, but it cannot be sufficient. If laws or actions produce effects that are inconsistent with such laws' or actions'
underlying proper motivations, the laws or actions cannot be
constitutional. For ultimately, effects in the world are all that
matter, even conceding the materiality of motivation. Or put
somewhat differently, no properly motivated government would
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be content with laws that in fact do not achieve the ideals of the
admissible normative theories or a proper compromise. Thus,
proper motivation and proper effects are both necessary for constitutionality, and neither is sufficient by itself.
Although the materiality of effects complicates the constitutional analysis of optional allocations in one sense, it solves the
last of the previously mentioned conceptual problems of motive
inquiry, namely, the problem of mistaken intermediate motives.
If a legislature has a proper ultimate motivation but has an improper lower level motivation (because it misperceives the relation in the world between the two), its law will probably produce
effects that are inconsistent with the ultimate motivation and its
justificatory normative theory. For example, if a legislature is
properly motivated to achieve, say, Left liberalism, but erroneously believes that racial classifications further that end and so is
motivated to enact laws containing racial classifications, those
laws will probably produce effects that fail to correspond to a
proper justificatory theory or compromise. Thus, even if we do
not deem laws unconstitutional because of improper intermediate motivations, those laws will almost always be unconstitutional due to their effects.
V.

REMEDIES AND STANDING

Even if we can figure out when and why allocations of optional benefits and burdens are unconstitutional, what are we justified in demanding of the lawmakers when we identify an
unconstitutional allocation? If, for instance, the allocation is unconstitutional because of its underlying motivation, as was State
Four's opening and closing of public pools in our earlier example,
or Yick Wo's license denial, what should follow? Must the pools
be kept open? Must Yick Wo get his license? Remember that
those states of affairs, though constitutional (with proper motivation), are not inherently "more" constitutional than their opposites (with proper motivation). And although we can ask
government to go back and make a new allocation with proper
motivation, there is no way to ensure that it will do so and good
reason to think that bad motives will persist for some period.
What do we do, then, if government does not provide a new,
properly-motivated allocation?
The problem transcends unconstitutionality due to improper
motivation and includes unconstitutionality due to improper effects. Even if State Four or the San Francisco Board of Supervisors were motivated by a legitimate normative theory and were
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merely misapplying it, so that the effects did not match the theory's blueprint, the problem of remedy would remain. Nor is the
problem circumscribed to a choice between pools or no pools, or
between a license or no license. For the range of optional allocations permitted includes every alternative set of laws except the
forbidden ones. Thus, State Four might close its pools but replace them with tennis courts, close its pools and put the money
into tax refunds, open its pools, but with shorter seasons, and so
on. San Francisco might ban laundries in wooden buildings altogether, or require licensees to prove financial solvency, to take
courses in laundry operations, or any of a number of possibilities,
some of which would result in Yick Wo's getting a license, others
of which would not. If government does not enact an option with
permissible effects and based on proper motives, what set of laws
out of the indefinitely larger number of constitutionally optional
sets should be imposed remedially?
There is no way to finesse this problem. Given that the existing set of laws is unconstitutional, some alternative set must be
imposed, and optionality assumes that there is more than one
such set. There is no way to avoid imposition, for the status quo
ante is unconstitutional. And we have said that repeals, failures
to enact, or failures to repeal can be unconstitutional (due to underlying motivation), which reinforces the point that some option
other than the status quo must be imposed. But which?
The problem of optional remedies leads to the problem of
standing. Under each possible constitutionally optional set of
laws that might supplant the present unconstitutional set, there
will be different winners and losers. Who then has standing to
challenge an unconstitutional set of laws? Does anyone who
would benefit under a constitutionally permissible set that might
supplant the existing set have standing to challenge that set?
Consider Regents v. Bakke.zz The Supreme Court held that
racial set-asides in the admissions process violated the Equal
Protection Clause. Alan Bakke presumably would have been admitted had there been a racially-blind consideration of only
grades and test scores. Moreover, such an alternative system of
admission to state medical schools would have been constitutional, or so the Court implied and everyone assumed. Presumably, because this latter system would have been constitutional
and would have resulted in Bakke's admission, whereas Davis's
actual system was unconstitutional and resulted in denying him
admission, Bakke was deemed to have standing to challenge the
22.

Regents of the Univ. of Calif at Davis v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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constitutionality of Davis's system.23 It was unconstitutional as
to him.
But note that the Court did not deny that state-run medical
schools were constitutionally optional. Nor did the Court imply
that if the state chooses to have a medical school, it can only be
of one type with one kind of admissions process. We must assume that the University of California could close its Davis campus medical school, keep it open but restrict it to certain
specialties, keep it open but have open admission, and so on.
The more options the Constitution leaves open to the University
of California, the more people who might benefit by holding the
status quo to be unconstitutional. If Bakke had standing to challenge the system, why would not anyone else who might benefit
from some constitutionally optional alternative?
One answer is that the system in Bakke was "unfair" to
Bakke but not to others. This reply is unsatisfactory, however,
because the system is unfair to Bakke only by reference to an
alternative under which Bakke benefits. However, there are alternatives under which persons other than Bakke who could not
get into medical school for other reasons would benefit, as well,
and many under which Bakke would not benefit. For example,
applicants who would have gained admission under an open or
random admission process but who would not qualify for admission under the system in Bakke could also claim to have been
treated "unfairly."
VI.

OTHER APPROACHES TO CONSTITUTIONALLY
OPTIONAL BENEFITS AND BURDENS

I have described a particular way of understanding how the
Constitution might constrain the allocation of benefits and burdens that are otherwise constitutionally optional. One might
conclude, however, that the way I have described, which depends
upon the Constitution's referring to two or more alternative normative theories as ultimate sources for evaluating government
action, succeeds at too high a price. For if optional normative
theories explain constitutionally constrained but constitutionally
optional benefits and burdens, then constitutional analysis will be
burdened with messy evidentiary problems regarding motives
and effects, conceptual problems regarding motives, and uncertainty regarding remedies and standing.
23.

Id. at 277-81, 320.
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Thus, there is reason to look briefly at some possible alternatives to this way of reconciling constitutional optionality with
constitutional constraint. In this concluding section, I shall do so.
Suppose that the Constitution does not refer to optional
normative theories. Suppose that only one such theory lies behind the constitutional scheme, and that the appearance of optional benefits and burdens is just that, an appearance, and one
born of judicial uncertainty about what the one animating normative theory requires. Thus, if the Constitution embodies
Rawlsian contractarianism, then where the courts can discern
what that theory requires, they stand ready to invalidate laws and
actions that are inconsistent with it. Where, however, they are
uncertain regarding what Rawlsian contractarianism requires,
they defer to the legislature's choice, which creates the sense that
the legislature has an option under the Constitution. In reality,
of course, it does not, but the courts' epistemic limitations translate into legislative finality regarding the constitutionality of its
choices.
On the other hand, even if some allocations of benefits and
burdens are treated by the courts as if they are optional because
the courts do not know which allocations are required by the one
normative theory in play, other allocations of those same benefits
and burdens need not be so treated. For example, the courts may
not know whether Rawlsian contractarianism requires a high
level of wealth redistribution or a much lower level, but they may
be quite certain that Rawlsian contractarianism cannot justify,
say, high welfare for whites and low welfare for blacks.
Thus, we have an alternative account of how there can be
constitutionally optional benefits and burdens that are nonetheless somewhat constitutionally constrained, an account that
posits only one justifying normative theory rather than multiple
ones.24 Nonetheless, although this account may affect the legislature and administrators differently from the earlier one-it directs them to try to realize the ideals of a single normative theory
rather than giving them a choice among more than one-it affects the courts qua reviewing agencies no differently from the
earlier one. From the courts' perspective, at least, there will be
constitutional options. And if there are constitutional options,
then from the courts' perspective, it will be as if there actually
were constitutionally optional normative theories. All of the
problems of motive inquiry, remedies, and standing that arose
under our original account will arise for the courts under this ac24.

See Alexander, 42 Ohio St. L.J. at 20 (cited in note 14).
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count, and in exactly the same way. Options as a consequence of
epistemic uncertainty will for the courts feel no different from
options as a consequence of normative relativity.
An alternative account of optional benefits/burdens and
their constraints can be found in process theories of constitutional law, such as John Ely's.zs Essentially, these theories view
the Constitution as a set of very narrow constraints designed to
ensure well-functioning democratic institutions. So long as those
institutions do not attempt to free themselves from the constraints that ensure the purity of the process and are not otherwise infected with process-undermining conditions (such as
"prejudice"), their decisions are constitutional whatever those
decisions may be.
There is a familiar and I believe fatal objection to process
accounts of constitutional law such as Ely's. Commentators as
diverse as Paul Brest, Samuel Freeman, Laurence Tribe, and
Michael Perry have pointed out that process theories ultimately
must rest on substantive theories (in Ely's case, some version of
utilitarianism).26 Without a substantive theory, no particular process nor set of constraints can be justified. With a substantive
theory, however, the existence of options becomes problematic.
A similar criticism applies to more philosophically ambitious
"process" theories, such as the "dialogic" theories of Bruce Ackerman and Jtirgen Habermas:z7 the substantive constraints necessary to secure an "ideal speech situation" for reaching moral
agreement may include everything morally significant, leaving no
options open for dialogic resolution.zs
Another way to preserve constitutional options that are
nonetheless constrained is to interpret constraints such as equal
protection and freedom of speech as very specific, rule-like
prohibitions and not as broad moral principles. For example, if
equal protection just means the state may not discriminate on the
25. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harv. U.
Press, 1980).
26. See Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 Ohio St. L.J. 131 (1981); Samuel
Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review, 9 Law & Phil.
327 (1990-91); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale LJ. 1063, 1071 (1980); Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, The
Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the Letigimacy of Constitutional Policymaking
by the Judiciary n-90 (Yale U. Press, 1982).
27. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (Yale U. Press, 1980);
Jiirgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Beacon Press, Thomas McCarthy, trans., 1975).
28. See Walzer, Moral Minima/ism, in W.R. Shea & A. Spadafora, eds., From the
Twilight of Probability: Ethics and Politics 3, 11 (Science History Publications, 1992);
Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 San Diego L.
Rev. 763, 784-85 n.48 (1993).
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basis of race and ethnicity in the allocation of benefits and burdens, then all allocations that do not rest on racial or ethnic distinctions will be optional insofar as the Equal Protection Clause
is concerned.z9 Similarly, if freedom of speech is just a rule
against viewpoint discrimination, then government has a considerable range of options as far as freedom of speech is concerned.
The problem with viewing constitutional constraints in this
rule-like manner is that rules cannot be judicially extended or
modified to adapt to everchanging situations. For example, an
Equal Protection Clause that is a "rule" against racial or ethnic
discrimination simply does not apply to gender discrimination,
discrimination against illegitimates, and so forth, even if these
latter forms of discrimination are morally analogous to the forms
proscribed. Extension of a rule by analogy requires treating the
rule as merely an application of a more general principle, which
principle covers the new case and renders it analogous to those
covered by the original rule. In short, extensions of a rule require treating it not as a rule but as a principle.
Now there are advantages to treating constitutional provisions as rules, not principles. Justice Scalia has written in favor of
doing so wholesale;Jo Fred Schauer has endorsed doing so retail.Jt And treating constitutional provisions as rules preserves
the optionality of most benefits and burdens while at the same
time explaining how they can be constrained. On the other hand,
rules are posited, canonical norms, and arguments over their interpretation are highly constrained by these characteristics. If
the 1868 Framers failed to consider how gender discrimination
was morally similar to racial discrimination in fashioning their
equal protection "rule," gender discrimination is forever after exempt from equal protection invalidation, even if the moral principle that lies behind equal protection also applies to gender
discrimination. That some practice is morally like another is a
conclusive moral reason for treating them the same way, but it is
frequently a very weak reason for assuming that the framers of a
rule that deals with one also meant the rule to deal with the
other. Rules are the products of particular individuals at particular times laboring under limitations of knowledge, imagination,
empathy, and logic.
29. See note 11 supra.
30. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175
(1989).
31. Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of RuleBased Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Clarendon Press, 1991).
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Some might argue that constitutional constraints are not
fixed, limited rules but rather reflect some single but powerful
moral principle, such as the principle of equality of respect or the
principle against subordination.32 Government's options regarding benefits and burdens can be quite broad; so long as government's allocations do not reflect inequality of respect or do not
subordinate, they are constitutionally permissible. For example,
both welfare and its absence could be constitutionally permissible, whereas welfare for whites but not blacks would violate the
equality of respect and/or anti-subordination principle. Thus, we
end up with constitutional options and constitutional constraints.
The problem with these theories lies in their assumption that
equality of respect or anti-subordination principles can be
fleshed out without a full-blown normative theory that would in
turn undermine optionality. For example, Dworkin, who introduced equality of respect as his candidate for the equal protection norm, has now fleshed out that principle to entail a complete
moral philosophy.33 And there is no reason to assume that an
anti-subordination principle would not lead to the same result.
For example, it is a very short step from "welfare for whites but
not blacks subordinates blacks" to "no welfare for anyone subordinates blacks (who are disproportionately likely to be poor)."
Indeed, it is a step many have already taken.34 And the implicit
theory behind such a step would leave little room for options.
One final theory for reconciling constitutional options with
constitutional constraints is to view the latter as directed toward
forbidding government from (unjustly) stigmatizing persons. For
example, all sorts of allocations might be permissible, but those
that would stigmatize, such as more welfare for whites than for
blacks, would be unconstitutional.
This theory would, of course, need a theory about when persons are justified in feeling stigmatized, so that the mere claim
that one feels stigmatized is not sufficient to make out a constitutional violation. Presumably the theory would link the justifiability of feeling stigmatized to actually being stigmatized. It would
thus have to provide an account of when people are stigmatized,
or more specifically, are stigmatized unjustifiably.
32. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 180-83, 272-78 (Harv. U. Press,
1977) (equality of respect); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 16-21
(Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988) (antisubjugation).
33. See Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, in Grethe B. Peterson,
ed., XI The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1 (1990).
34. See Tribe, American Constitlltional Law at 1518-21 (cited in note 32).
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It should be apparent, however, that a theory of unjustifiable stigmatization, like theories of equality of respect or subordination, must inevitably tum into a full-blown normative theory.
People will be unjustifiably stigmatized to the extent-and only
to the extent-they do not receive their moral due. Even if the
focus is restricted to government officials' states of mind-did
they regard the constitutional claimants in an unjustifiably stigmatic manner?-the states of mind can only be characterized as
stigmatizing by reference to a full-blown normative theory.
Moreover, if the gravamen of the complaint is that the officials'
states of mind are stigmatizing, no remedy exists to cure such a
constitutional defect: we can impose sets of laws on governmental officials, but we cannot-or surely courts with their ordinary
remedies cannot-change officials' views of others. If unconstitutional stigma lies in the officials' attitudes, stigma is beyond the
power of courts to remedy.

CONCLUSION
I have argued that reconciling constitutionally optional benefits and burdens with constitutional constraints on their allocations is theoretically problematic. Constraints seem to require a
normative theory, but a single normative theory undermines the
existence of options. Linking constitutional options to optional
normative theories, however, saves options at the cost of introducing the difficult practical and conceptual problems of motive
inquiry, remedy, and standing. Finally, other approaches (pure
process, equality of respect, anti-subordination, anti-stigmatic)
either require a background normative theory, which again will
undermine options, or rest on conceiving constitutional constraints to be limited, fixed rules, opaque to background moral
principles and incapable of extension or modification. It is thus
not surprising that the intersection of constitutionally optional
benefits and burdens with constitutional constraints has produced a doctrinal mess and a theoretical nightmare.3s

35. See Unconstitutional Conditions Symposium, 26 San Diego L. Rev. 175 (1989).

